Saturday, November 19, 2011

胡立阳:弃金投股 2571点下捡便宜

胡立阳:弃金投股 2571点下捡便宜
http://msn.finance.sina.com.cn 2011-09-26 03:29 来源: 中国证券报-中证网

  田露

  □本报记者 田露 贵阳报道

  前美林证券副总裁,著名投资人士胡立阳为参与9月24日“建行·中证报金牛基金系列巡讲”贵阳站活动的投资者带来的不是枯燥的理论分析,而是充满激情的股市信心动员演说。支持其“A股在2571点以下都是买入良机”观点更多的是出于技术分析层面的把握和多年来的经验直觉。

  胡立阳认为,投资者对于欧美经济和希腊债务问题忧虑太多,导致信心缺失。其实股市运行与经济之间并没有紧密联系,根据他过往在美国证券界的工作经验及数年来对于新兴市场的研究,股市表现有其时间规律,在启动和调整方面也有一定的规律可循。

  他表示,每年八九月全球股市都表现不太好,而每年最后两个月至来年一月,往往是股市的最佳行情时期。此外,涉及到个股投资,当股价突破并上涨20%时,将遭遇到较强的调整压力。从股市整体来看,当其从筑底后的低点启动,上涨至一倍阶段时,往往出现剧烈调整,而且会延续较长时间,因此在投资过程中要分外小心。

  胡立阳以A股市场为例,指出其在2008年确认1664点的底部之后,一路上涨至3478点,之后出现绵延不绝的调整,直至现在。不过,他认为,根据经验来看,选取底部与顶部平均的中位线,只要股指在其下方区域,都可以大胆买入。目前来看,A股已处于2571点的中位线区域以下,正是 “捡便宜货”的好时机。

  除了估值便宜使A股市场蕴含着“危机即转机”的机遇,他同时向与会投资者指出了其他积极因素。他表示,现在全球市场缺乏的是信心,而不是资金,由于资金泛滥,空头市场不会真的形成。此外,2012年就是美国大选年,选举因素将导致美国政府不会任由糟糕的经济局面持续。

  胡立阳说,在股市中不可盲从价值投资理念,一只有价值的股票,如果在高位买入,也不会带来投资收益;投资时应当对价格保持敏感,对于股价的“底档”与“高档”区位比较了解。他同时鼓舞现场的投资者,要获得不错的收益,在股市中就应当具有一定的逆向思维能力,要勇于在股市低位时买入。

  在为投资者分析投资机遇的过程中,胡立阳论述了对于黄金市场的看法。他表示,截至目前,黄金涨势已经告一段落,眼下投资一定要谨慎。黄金价格处于每盎司1300 美元至1400美元时,全世界投资黄金的热情都在高涨,但转势已经出现,只是由于利比亚等北非国家局势动荡,以及欧洲债务危机等因素影响,对金价构成利好。投资者从金价冲破每盎司1900美元关口后大幅调整的迹象中应提高风险意识,将注意力转移到估值更低的股市中去。



Source/转贴/Extract/Excerpts: MSN中文
Publish date: 19/11/11

Weekend Comment Nov 18: Stocks to ride the earnings slide

THE PAST WEEK couldn’t have ended on a weaker note, what with the closing of a disappointing 3Q2011 earnings reporting season and weaker than expected October exports, which were down 16.2 % y-o-y, the worst figures in 30 months and more than double what economists had expected for the period.

Already bruised and battered by Europe’s debt crisis and stagnation in the US, the local bourse took a further hit, with the Straits Times Index falling almost 100 points during the week to close at 2,739 points on Nov 18. As such, research houses in Singapore have released a flurry of reports recommending investment strategies and value buys to ride the upcoming quarters -- which most believe could be as bleak as the recent 3Q, or worse.

In The Edge Singapore this week (No. 499), we highlighted the views of local research house DMG & Partners, which is recommending that investors shore up their portfolios with defensive blue chip stocks to ride the weaker earnings environment. Since then, several other research houses have also released strategy reports, including local brokerage DBS Vickers.

DBS Vickers -- which cut target prices for 48% of the stocks under its coverage compared to the 19% which received upgrades -- believes that the Singapore economy has yet to bottom out, and that investors should expect weaker earnings for another two quarters. In 3Q2011, corporate earnings as a whole were down 10%, dragged down by losses incurred by Neptune Orient Lines, Noble Group and Broadway Industrial Group, as well as lower earnings from Sembcorp Marine, Cosco Corporation, Keppel T&T, tech companies Amtek and Hi-P, Singapore Airlines and SMRT.

DBS Vickers also cut valuations by 20% on several stocks, including Indonesian instant noodle maker Conscience Food, palm oil players Kencana Agri and Mewah, SIA, Amtek, Ezra Holdings, CapitaLand, CapitaMalls Asia and CSE Global. On average, it has reduced its target valuations by about 8%. “As earnings have yet to come to an end, signaling that the market has yet to find its floor, we believe it is too early to take positions in cyclical, which remain vulnerable,” DBS notes in its report. “Marco risks prevail, and a deleveraging of European banks is giving rise to a liquidity squeeze, which could take the STI down to the 2,500 level.”

Where then, should investors place their bets to make money during the downturn? DBS Vickers recommends while accumulating stocks with high earnings visibility, low earnings risks and high yields. On its buy list is Singapore Telecommunications, ComfortDelgro, CapitaMalls Trust, Global Logistic Properties, Mapletree Commercial Trust, Sembcorp Industries and UOL.

Meanwhile, the brokerage house urges investors to take advantage of temporary spikes in the market to sell cyclical as well as high global exposure stocks. “High risk sectors that are most vulnerable to earnings downgrades include transport and logistics, technology, banks, offshore and marine, plantations, supply chain management and property,” it notes. The brokerage is calling a sell on City Developments, SGX, Cosco, NOL, Goodpack and SIA.



Source/转贴/Extract/Excerpts: www.theedgesingapore.com
Publish date: 19/11/11

Ezra: FPSO terminated (CLSA)

Ezra
S$.93 - OUTPERFORM
12M hi/lo S$1.86/.75
12M price target S$1.15

FPSO terminated
The termination of Lewek Arunothai’s contract with PTTEP is leading us to reduce our FY12 earnings forecasts for Ezra by 10% and our target price by 5cts. It is adding new uncertainty as the FPSO owned by Ezra’s Oslolisted subsidiary EOC has not yet been awarded the new contract it bid for. Before its goes onto its new field the FPSO will require 9 months of conversion work estimated at US$30-40m. Ezra’s offshore support services and subsea services are set to improve in FY12. Maintain O-PF.

Arunothai contract terminated
Ezra’s 47% owned associate EOC announced that its FPSO Lewek Arunothai will be concluding its contract with PTTEP at the end of November 2011. This is earlier than anticipated as the FPSO has only been on field since October 2009 and was on a 3+2 year contract. EOC has stated that the contract was terminated early as it hopes to deploy the FPSO for a 3-5 year opportunity in S.E Asia with a new client at a higher charter rate.

Bidding for a new contract
This development is negative for EOC as it means that the FPSO will not be contributing to earnings for at least 12 months and adds a lot of uncertainty to future earnings. If the Arunothai wins the contract, she will have to undergo at least 9 months of conversion work (FPSOs are custom build for specific fields), which is expected to cost US$30-40m. While the FPSO has the correct specs for the field EOC bid for, there is no guarantee that it will be awarded the new contract for which the results are expected by yearend. This means that the FPSO could potentially be idle for longer than that.

Downgrading forecasts
We assume that the Arunothai does obtain the new contract with an average day rate of US$180k, which is in between the US$165-225k day rates that she was getting with PTTEP. As a result of this we are reducing our EOC FY12 earnings forecasts by 75% and Ezra’s by 11%. This also leads us to reduce our SOTP target price by 5cts to S$1.15.

Ezra’ businesses set to improve
Ezra’s offshore support services business is set to improve as charter rates pick up in 2H12. Additionally, we expect AMC to start making positive contributions as the company recognizes US$400m in subsea contracts. Ezra’s gearing is set to reach 140% by the end of FY12 but we expect the company to divest some of its assets to raise cash. Maintain O-PF.

Arunothai contract terminated
Ezra’s 47% owned associate EOC announced that its FPSO Lewek Arunothai will be concluding its contract with PTTEP at the end of November 2011. This is earlier than anticipated as the FPSO has only been on field since October 2009 and it was on a 3+2 year contract. EOC has stated that the contract was terminated early as it hopes to deploy the FPSO for a 3-5 year opportunity in S.E Asia with a new client at a higher charter rate. The contract with PTTEP was tiered. For the first 3 years EOC was getting day rates of US$225,000. This would have fallen to US$165,000 as of November 2012. By terminating this contract early EOC will loose US$76m in revenues over the next 12 months.

Bidding for a new contract
This development is negative for EOC as it means that the FPSO will not be contributing to earnings for at least 12 months and adds a lot of uncertainty to future earnings. If the Arunothai wins the contract, she will have to undergo at least 9 months of conversion work before she goes on field in 4Q12. FPSOs are custom build for specific fields. The Lewek Arunothai cost US$319m to build. The alterations required for the movement to the new field of US$30-40m are actually considered quite minimal. EOC management’s has indicated that the topside modules will remain untouched. The main changes would be to the mooring system. It is rare to find another opportunity for an FPSO that requires so little alteration work before the unit can be redeployed.
While the FPSO has the right specs for the field EOC bid for, there is no guarantee that the FPSO will be awarded the new contract. The results of the bid will be announced by yearend. This means that the FPSO could potentially be idle for longer than 12 months.

Downgrading forecasts
We assume that the Arunothai does obtain the new contract with an average day rate of US$180k, which is in between the US$165-225k day rates that she was getting with PTTEP. As a result of this we are reducing our EOC FY12 earnings forecasts by 75% and Ezra’s by 11%. This also leads us to reduce our SOTP target price by 5cts to S$1.15. We are raising our FY14 forecast on the back of the new higher charter rates by 87% for EOC and by 2% for Ezra.

Ezra’ businesses set to improve
Ezra’s offshore support services business is set to improve as charter rates pick up in 2H12 with the roll-over of some of the lower rate contracts. Additionally, we expect AMC to start making positive contributions as the company recognizes US$400m in subsea contracts, which should allow it to post 10% gross margins. Ezra’s gearing is the main concern as it is set to reach 140% by the end of FY12. We expect the company to divest some of its assets to raise cash. These could be its energy services, its stake in Ezion or even its stake in EOC’s 2nd FPSO the Lewek EMAS.


Source/转贴/Extract/Excerpts: CLSA Asia-Pacific
Publish date:18/11/11

Investment lessons over lunch

Business Times - 19 Nov 2011

SHOW ME THE MONEY
Investment lessons over lunch

Some seasoned investors share their experiences and their views on where the market is heading

By TEH HOOI LING
SENIOR CORRESPONDENT

I AM fortunate in the sense that occasionally I get invited by some really savvy retail investors to their informal gatherings. I usually glean a lot of wisdom, insights and inspiration from such sessions.

Two weeks back, I was invited to lunch with a full-time investor and his friends. Amongst them were business owners, investment and real estate professionals. The group talked about their investment philosophies, their views of the market, and what they are doing now.

One man was very generous in sharing the lessons he learnt in his investment journey. He used to work as a chief trader in a foreign bank trading instruments such as money market products and swaps. He left the bank many years back because he felt that he could do much better on his own than in the bank.

Since then, he has bought and sold private businesses, properties, equities, among other things. He is still running a few businesses on a small scale (because he doesn't believe in doing anything big), and at the same time he is also managing his own investments.

In the initial years, he lost a fair amount of money in his investments in private businesses. 'But I learnt so much in the process.'

The first million

Getting to the first $1 million, he said, usually takes the longest time. After that, the wealth can grow pretty fast if one is able to grab the right opportunities.

From the conversations, it seems that he - let's call him Mr A - made a few astute bets on the Singapore property market. In late 2006, he started to pick up units in Pearl Bank Apartments in Outram. That was when the en bloc fever was hotting up, and news emerged that the owners of the iconic development were exploring collective sale as an option.

He picked up four units of various sizes between November 2006 and September 2007. And he exited all his trades in September and October 2007. For the first unit he paid $645,000 and sold it for $1.5 million. Another he bought at $788,000 and sold at $1.88 million.

He felt that the en bloc price demanded was too high, and decided to sell his units as quickly as possible. So he told the real estate agents who specialised in that project at that time to bring any potential buyers to him first. He'd pay them a commission of 1.5 per cent, instead of the normal one per cent. As such, he was able to offload all four units in a short time.

True enough, the en bloc sale in 2007 fell through. So did the one in 2008. Earlier this year, the owners of the ageing development put the building up for sale again. Still, they failed to find a buyer.

Another lucrative deal Mr A managed to complete around the same time was of a landed property in Upper Bukit Timah. He paid some $500,000 for the property, tore it down and rebuilt it at a cost of $1 million. He sold the property which has a lease of just 38 years left for $3.8 million.

Like many investors, Mr A subscribes to Warren Buffett's rules when it comes to investing. Mr Buffett has two famous rules: Rule 1, Don't lose money. Rule 2, Don't forget Rule No 1.

Exit strategy

Mr A has another rule. Always decide on your exit strategy right from the outset. 'I'd do that when I go to a new place, say a hotel, as well. I'd check out where all the exits are so that I know what to do when anything happens. In other words, I don't have to frantically look for an exit in a panicky state,' he said.

Mr A shared a story of a friend who came to him for advice. This friend had bought into a warrant, whose price had plunged from 20 cents to seven cents. The friend asked what he should do with his holding. Mr A advised him to sell and take back whatever cash he could. There was a high likelihood the warrant would become worthless, he reckoned.

The friend managed to get back $50,000 in cash. Again, he asked Mr A what he should do with the money. Coincidentally, Mr A was looking at Novena Holdings at that time. It was the time when Oei Hong Leong offloaded his holdings in Novena amid his lawsuit against Citigroup. Mr Oei had alleged that Citi had misled him into losing some $1 billion from foreign exchange and United States Treasury bond transactions.

Mr Oei sold Novena at eight cents a share, compared with the 21 cents each that he had paid for them. As one of Mr A's strategies is to track the transactions of major league smart investors, he suggested that his friend might want to take a look at Novena. 'What? Buy this stock when Oei Hong Leong is selling?' his friend asked. Mr A answered: 'He didn't want to sell. He was forced to sell.' So the friend got in, and fortunately for him, Novena doubled in the next nine months. He advised his friend to take his profits.

Since then, Novena has changed its name to Viking. Although Mr A advised his friend to exit the counter, he himself held on. Today, Viking trades at about 10 cents a share, and Mr A is sitting on a paper loss of some $400,000. But he said he is keeping faith in the stock.

Having caught the property market in one of the major bull runs, Mr A is of the view that the next money to be made is in the equity market.

He said he is still raising cash, and is waiting for an opportune time to get into the market. He deployed 10 per cent of his cash hoard into the market in early October, but after seeing the sharp rebound in the market despite the fact that there was no fundamental change in outlook, he cashed out again.

He said he learnt from the last crisis. Then, he was adamant that he would only put all his cash to work when the Straits Times Index fell to 1,250 points. It never did, and so only 10 per cent of his cash managed to ride the market up in 2009. This time round, he said he would gradually deploy his cash at a 'low enough' level.

Sitting on cash

Another investor in the group, Mr B, managed to catch the bottom in the last crisis, when the STI hit 1,500 points. Then, convinced that equities were just too cheap, he mortgaged his properties, paying an interest rate of 2 per cent, and plonked the entire sum into Reits, which were yielding 10-plus per cent at that time.

He has since exited the market completely and is sitting on cash. In addition, he has raised additional cash from banks using his three properties as a pledge. This time, he is paying an even lower rate of 1.5 per cent. And he is looking to get into the market when the STI falls to 2,500 points. Again, he is intending to put his money in Reits which own prime properties.

The group however noted that over-leveraging can wipe out an investor. But they acknowledged the relative soundness of Mr B's strategy of raising cash from his real estate at a cheap rate, and deploying it into the stock market during a crash. This is a far smarter move than taking up share margin financing during a bull market.

On the macro front, the investment professional in the group said there is one trend that is playing out, and that is the world economic growth is slowing. Corporate earnings will be downgraded, and equities will continue to be derated. During this period too, the markets may intermittently be shaken by the panic caused by the crisis in Europe. He is advising his clients to keep their cash, but to get ready to put it to work over a six-month period next year.

Tremendous liquidity

While the group agreed that there isn't yet any real solution to the euro crisis - Greece leaving the eurozone may be one solution although that may cause upheavals in the market in the short term - the fact is there is tremendous amount of liquidity on the sidelines. These funds would be very eager to get back into the market, and so the rebound in equities, when it comes, might be very sharp.

As the conversations wound down, Mr B reminded the group not to forget to appreciate life even as they busy themselves with work. One of his friends just passed away from a heart attack. The key, agreed everyone, is to maintain a balanced life.

The lunch ended on a very heartening note when the group talked about the pro-bono work they are doing in their various communities. One said that a private investor, who was single, left behind $13 million when he passed away to his community development association. The instruction was that the capital cannot be touched for a certain number of years, and only the dividends can be used to pay for the education of needy kids.

Another investor is working with volunteers to make monthly visits to low-income families and coach them on their budgeting. Yet another runs a childcare for the low-income group.

All lament the lack of volunteers in their organisations, but admitted that getting funds might not be that big an issue. My contribution to the conversation: Perhaps they should seriously consider employing full-time staff to run some of these programmes. I'm sure the programmes will be better administered as a result, and more help will reach those who really need it.


The writer is a CFA charterholder

Source/转贴/Extract/Excerpts: www.businesstimes.com.sg
Publish date: 19/11/11

Daiwa downgrades property outlook

Business Times - 19 Nov 2011


Daiwa downgrades property outlook

It predicts multi-year downturn that will slash private home prices by 22-26% in a 3-year period

By FELDA CHAY

AT LEAST one research house has turned thoroughly negative on Singapore's private property sector, predicting that it will see a multi-year downturn that will slash private home prices by between 22-26 per cent within a three-year period.

Daiwa Capital Markets' David Lum and Tony Darwell believe that a potent mix of factors such as an economic slowdown and a build-up in unsold inventory in the primary market will hit the private homes market here, and have downgraded their outlook to negative from neutral in a Nov 16 report.

They are among the most bearish of analysts covering the Singapore property market.

Others have expressed similar concerns about the uncertain economic climate and jump in unsold inventory, but most have not turned so decidedly pessimistic.

Nomura, in a report released yesterday, said that inventory build-up is expected to increase further and is a 'key risk', but did not make the cuts on the sector that Daiwa did.

Citibank, in its Property Insights report on activity within the sector in the third quarter, said that 'if the global outlook worsens and the economy continues to slow down, this will eventually affect buying sentiment and lead to less exuberant purchase activity'.

Daiwa believes that the build-up in unsold inventory 'would reach record levels' and 'would keep home prices . . . in check for several years'.

It based its prediction on the currently high unsold inventory level, and a forecast influx of new supply that together will flood the market.

Already, new private housing supply at the end of September hit the highest level since pre-global financial crisis levels at 86,332 units, noted Daiwa.

It added that just 43 per cent, or 37,114 of these units have been sold.

'This implies that developers still have to sell (or launch eventually) the remaining 49,188 unsold units', of which 11,480 are under construction while the others are 'planned', said Daiwa.

'Although developers have the flexibility to hold back the launches of private land projects, GLS (government land sales) sites awarded to developers would have to be launched for sale eventually (the typical stipulated project completion period is 60 months from the award of the site, after which the government would impose onerous penalties for slippage).'

It believes that the unsold inventory of private homes totalled 12,035 units as at end-September, which is nearly back to figures seen during the peak of the global financial crisis at the end of March 2009.

Its estimate took in unsold units in completed developments, those that were launched for sale in uncompleted developments but were not sold, and the remaining unlaunched units in uncompleted developments which have been partially launched.

'But unlike the previous peak, the build-up this time has been due to a rapid increase in units launched . . . and not a collapse in demand,' it said.

Daiwa also expects considerable new supply to hit the market, with between 12,043 and 17,000 new private homes likely to be completed annually from 2012 to 2015.

'The robust pipeline of completions for 2012-2015 is a reflection of record home sales in 2009-2011, as well as the record new supply injected in recent GLS announcements,' said Daiwa.

Its forecast for new private homes is lower than the Urban Redevelopment Authority's (URA), which project that 12,043 to 25,593 new houses will be built annually from 2012 to 2015.

Daiwa's negative view of the local property market comes after figures from URA released on Tuesday show that private home sales fell 15 per cent in October from September - although property consultants said that transactions in October were still relatively strong given the spike in sales that September drew.



Source/转贴/Extract/Excerpts: www.businesstimes.com.sg
Publish date: 19/11/11

罗杰斯:两年不会买股票

罗杰斯:两年不会买股票
http://www.sina.com.cn 2011年11月18日08:11 南方都市报 微博

高交会进入第二日,一位大师成功将各家媒体的眼球从热闹的展会现场吸引到他的身上。作为本届高交会的特邀嘉宾,华尔街传奇投资大师吉姆·罗杰斯连轴转地参加了上午的资本市场论坛、中午的高交会记者服务广场以及下午的中国创业家峰会,所到之处均被媒体长枪短炮包围,掀起一股“罗杰斯旋风”。大家都想从这位投资大师身上取到“真经”,因此如何投资和买股成为被问及最多的话题,但罗杰斯的回答令不少人失望:他认为欧美经济面临相当大的危机,未来2年很难见底,而没有见底前他不会出手买股票。

  未来两年全球股市将持续低迷

  对于自己的投资计划,罗杰斯透露他已卖空了很多股票,到现在还没有买多少中国股票。但罗杰斯表示,如果情况变得更糟的话,他反而可能买进更多中国股票。罗杰斯说,他在1998、2005年和2008年11月曾三次买进中国股票,因为那时候中国的股市在下滑。这是因为他认为中国将会成为21世纪最伟大的国家,所以希望他的孩子可以拥有他持有的中国股票。

  挤爆了会场的参会者都希望从这位全球知名的投资大师口中学到投资赚钱的诀窍,但他却表示,现在西方的形势并不很好,美国是最大的债务国,而欧洲也出现债务危机,他们都是西方的核心,所以西方的经济将会放缓,他判断此次将会比2008年的状况还要糟,2年内都不会有牛市。尽管亚洲各国的政府会做一些事情来避免西方的影响,中国目前的经济情况也很好,但受到欧美经济增长放缓影响,未来两年中国股市仍将低迷。

  呼吁放开人民币自由兑换

  作为投资大师,对于中国经济有何建议?对此罗杰斯心直口快:赶快让人民币自由兑换。罗杰斯描述了一幅人民币自由浮动下的图景:全球会有更多的人使用人民币,中国老百姓购买的货物将便宜很多,大豆、能源等商品的价格都将下降,13亿人口的生活水平都改善,出口和贸易都得到调整。罗杰斯认为,中国现在的外汇储备那么多,应该可以自由兑换,这对中国也是有利。他甚至希望,人民币应该当天下午就自由浮动,这样全世界在国际贸易中可以自由使用。

  罗杰斯表示,中国金融业要发展得更快,就要大力发展股市,成为国际化金融中心,但如果不开放汇率就不可能实现这一目标。中国的深圳和上海已是金融业十分发达的城市,但他希望在这里不仅是买入A股和B股,而可以让所有投资者到中国来投资。

  看好中国让女儿从小学中文

  不同于对全球股市的看空,罗杰斯对中国未来的发展极力看好,他断言“19世纪属于英国,20世纪属于美国,21世纪就应该属于中国”。他表示,他在其它地方的股票可能会买进也会卖出,但是在中国的股市上,他采取的策略是低的时候买进。罗杰斯认为,与中国相比美国是在走下坡路,因为目前美国持有的债务非常多,这会带来严重后果,导致世界开始远离美元。

  尽管罗杰斯强调现在还不会买中国股票,但他表示在有些地方中国的经济会发展得非常好,这样就有很多的投资机会,如与供水相关的产业、农业相关的产业,投资者都可以从中赚到很多钱。此外,中国的高新技术也有快速发展,未来10到20年全球的科技中心也有可能从硅谷转移到中国,因为每年这里有比美国多7倍的工程师从学校毕业,因此将比美国更有优势和竞争力。

  罗杰斯认为,在中国的很多地方都可以创造财富,机会非常广。他也建议大家“跟着政府走”,多关注政府的行为,比如政府在农业供水方面做了跟多工作,投资者就可以跟随政府的脚步把钱投到政府关注的方面。

  在“传授”过程中,罗杰斯时不时提到自己的两个小女儿,并以她们为例来具体讲解如何投资。罗杰斯说,他经常给朋友们建议让他们的子孙后代学中文,因为中文将会成为子孙后代最重要的语言。他的两个女儿在学中文,且中文说得非常好,他希望她们以后不要到美国上学,可以在中国上大学,包括北京大学、深圳大学,因为未来深圳会成为世界金融中心,也将会有一流的教育。

  中午的高交会记者服务广场成为记者们追访罗杰斯的主要“战场”。半小时内,罗杰斯接受了近20个问题的密集“轰炸”。

  问:人民币对美元汇率是否应该提高?

  答:人民币应有大幅浮动,如果经济要有活力货币就要浮动,人民币就要自由兑换,而且越早越好。政府应选择合适的时候来进行。如果可以自由兑换,货币更加强劲,每一个中国人可活得很好,所有商品的价格都会下降。

  问:对于当前的欧债危机,中国是否应该出手相助?

  答:作为投资者,我不会向欧洲投资。但如果中国投资,可能会有一些益处,因为中国帮助欧洲不仅可以使欧洲进一步开放市场,也可以对国际货币基金组织、世界银行有影响,改革外汇援助,加大对外的影响力。中国是一个蓬勃发展的经济体,可以帮助欧洲,但对于投资者 ,购 买 欧 洲 基金是一个错误、糟糕的投资。

  问:对于美元的走势怎么看?

  答 :美元不会再继续强势了,是一个逐渐消失的货币,但我不知道具体时间表。我会选择在强势的时机卖出美元,不会再持有。

  问:巴菲特最近透露购买了IB M股份,你是否也会购买中国的科技股?

  答:我不知道巴菲特的这笔投资是否是个明智抉择,所以不会评论。但我对于投资科技更为谨慎,以前也投资过高科技的股票,如果有好的前景我会继续投资。如果我在中国找到一个好的高科技股票,一定会投。

  问:你鼓励女儿学中文、来中国上大学,到她18岁来中国上学,你是否会买中国的房地产?

  答:中国是下一个强国,未来21世纪是属于中国的。但你不能告诉18岁的女儿做任何事情,是不是要来中国上学,她不会听父亲的,而是有自己的判断。我未来会购买中国房地产,但目前中国房地产价格非常高,政府也在努力降低。

  ■论坛摘要

  明年紧缩政策有望适度放松

  一边是高通胀,一边是股市持续低迷、中小企业融资困难发展受限,中国经济是否已经处于两难?在昨日的资本市场论坛和中国创业家峰会上,中国人民大学金融与证券研究所所长吴晓求、北京大学副校长海闻等金融专家分析认为,随着通胀压力的逐步减缓,明年紧缩政策将会有所适度放松。

  今年中国经济增速预计将达到9.3%,G D P规模44万亿人民币约7万亿美元,人均G D P达到5千美元,但资本市场的表现却不尽如人意,绝大多数老百姓都从股市亏钱。对此吴晓求指出,资本市场的发展和经济增长不相匹配,这是由于中国金融改革和发展一直缺乏战略性研究。

  吴晓求表示,目前上市商业银行每年可能要在资本市场融资3000亿至4000亿,如果考虑更大规模的实体企业的融资,资本市场无疑面临着持续性的巨大的融资压力。吴晓求认为这种压力和2008年金融危机以来中国的金融创新改革停滞有关系,他呼吁要进行金融的结构性改革和创新,大力发展公司债市场,统一债券发行管理部门,推进信贷资产的证券化。此外,人民币国际化的进程要逐步加快,因为目前处于颓势的美元给人民币留下了空间,这种机遇不是一直有的。作为财富培育中心的创业板则需要引入退市制度,才能够消除泡沫。

  当前C PI一直保持高位运行,吴晓求认为当前中国的货币政策已经出现了某种微调信号,比如央行票据利率的下调和强调银行信贷对中小企业倾斜,基本可以判断政策的紧缩期已经结束,但这并不意味着货币政策的真正松动。预计当C PI低于4%,经济增长又受到某种压力时,货币政策会出现周期性的松动,而存款准备金率的下调才是松动的核心标志。海闻则预计,通货膨胀很快会出现下降,明年开始货币政策会适度放松,而政府也会转向关注G D P增长、企业问题和就业问题。

  本版采写:南都记者徐维强 见习记者王睦广


Source/转贴/Extract/Excerpts: 新浪网
Publish date: 18/11/11

Rickmers Maritime: The results were in line with our expectations (S&P)

Rickmers Maritime
Price: SGD0.34
Results Review
• Rickmers Maritime (RMT) reported 3Q11 revenue of USD38.2 mln (+4.3% YoY) and net profit of USD11.1 mln (3Q10: reported net loss of USD54.6 mln). Excluding one-off compensation expense of USD64.0 mln incurred in 3Q10, RMT’s 3Q11 recurring net profit improved 18.1% YoY. The results were in line with our expectations.

• During 3Q11, the revenue improvement was mainly due to higher charter rate for Kaethe C. Rickmers (increased to USD23,888/daily from USD8,288/daily on Mar. 25, 2011 for one-year extension) and continued high fleet utilization rate of 99.9%. Vessel operating expenses increased 5.0% YoY to USD8.4 mln with higher lubricant costs, and revision of fixed operating expenses & vessel management fees. Finance expenses decreased 9.7% YoY to USD10.8 mln with lower loan principal amount outstanding.

• RMT repaid USD35.8 mln of bank loans (including USD11.2 mln of excess repayment) during 9M11 as part of its deleveraging process to strengthen its balance sheet. As at end-3Q11, RMT’s total outstanding secured bank loans were USD635.1 mln (end-2010: USD670.9 mln). RMT has no short-term need for refinancing with the earliest maturity being in 2015 for its top-up loan facility of USD64.0 mln.

• RMT declared a distribution per unit of 0.6 US cents for 3Q11 (3Q10: 0.57 US cents). The distribution per unit is capped at 0.6 US cents per quarter during the period of waiver of value-to-loan (VTL) covenants.

Earnings Outlook / Estimates Revision
• We leave our FY11-12 projections for RMT largely unchanged. We expect 2012 charter revenue and net profit to be relatively stable with only one (Kaethe C. Rickmers) of out 16 containerships’ charters due for renewal in March 2012. If the current weakness in the charter market (current charter rate below USD15,000/daily for 4,400 TEU) persists, the charter renewal rate for Kaethe C. Rickmers will likely be lower than its current charter rate of USD23,888/daily.

• As at end-3Q11, RMT has remaining committed charter revenue of around USD650 mln. With regard to concerns on potential default or delay in payment of charter revenue, management is of the view that RMT’s charterers are leading global liner shipping companies with good reputation and track record of timely payment.

Investment Risks
• Key investment risks include: (i) foreign exchange risk with revenue and distribution denominated in USD but unit price is denominated in SGD; (ii) charter counter-party default risk which may adversely affect RMT’s cashflows but we take comfort that RMT’s charterers are leading shipping firms; and (iii) inability to meet VTL covenants after waiver period (until 2Q2013) may subject RMT to financing restructuring or penalties.

Source/转贴/Extract/Excerpts: Standard & Poor’s Equity Research
Publish date:15/11/11

Thai rubber growers cutting output by 25%

Thai rubber growers cutting output by 25%
The Bangkok Post reported today that planters in southern Thailand have agreed to reduce output by at least 25% in an attempt to stabilise natural rubber (NR) prices. According to Mr. Wit Pratuckchai, Director General of the Office of Rubber Replanting Aid Fund, planters will reduce tapping to 15 days a month from 20 days during the high season. He added that the Thai Agriculture Ministry was considering setting up a Bt10b intervention fund to finance traders who agree to buy rubber from planters at not lower than Bt120/kg for unsmoked rubber sheets. It was also reported that the International Rubber Consortium Company (IRCo) comprising the three leading rubber producers Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, will meet this weekend and possibly discuss plans to reduce exports.

These developments could prop up sentiment in the rubber market in the near term. However, we are sceptical whether farmers will actively reduce supply because rubber tapping is still profitable despite the recent correction in rubber prices. According to Sri Trang, the breakeven cost for Thai farmers is Bt60-70/kg (US$2000-2,300/MT), still far below the current TSR20 futures price of US$3,440/MT (SICOM). Additionally, we see minimal impact from the intervention fund because it would capture only 94k MT of demand (based on current spot TSR20 prices) or 0.9% of 2010 annual NR production and 3.3% of 2010/2011 peak production.

YTD TSR20 futures prices is averaging US$4,667/MT, close to our full year forecast of US$4,675. We expect CY12 TSR20 prices to average US$4,247 (or drop c.9% y-o-y). Rubber prices should remain weak up to 1QCY12 due to slowing OEM demand and destocking by tyre makers (due to slowing tyre demand in the US/Europe, drop in auto production due to Thai floods, and weak tyre makers’ profits in China).

However, NR prices should recover from 2QCY12 onwards, on the back of (i) Thai wintering period (seasonal cut in supply), and (ii) restocking by automotive sector as the supply chain recovers from the Thai floods, while rubber stocks held by Chinese dealers are gradually disposed. By 2QCY12, we might also see upside risks from (iii) continued strong crude oil/butadiene prices, and (iv) extreme measures such as export ban by Thai and Indonesian authorities.


Source/转贴/Extract/Excerpts: DBS Vickers Research
Publish date:16/11/11

比上一轮金融危机前峰值高27% 我国家庭至第三季底净财富估计1.25万亿元

比上一轮金融危机前峰值高27%
我国家庭至第三季底净财富估计1.25万亿元

我国家庭截至今年第三季底的净财富估计为1.25万亿元,比上一轮金融危机之前的峰值高出27%。

  家庭净财富是以资产减去债务计算。新加坡金融管理局在昨天发表的《金融稳定评估》报告中说,这是因为房地产市场保持升势、房地产的价值提高。

  这段期间,家庭的房地产总值估计为7380亿元,比去年同期高13.4%。

  今年第三季,除了股票与基金比一年前减少之外,其他资产都随经济复苏而增加。

  家庭的净财富维持在国内生产总值的3.9倍,与去年第三季相差不远。另一方面,家庭债务相对于资产的比率,也维持在15%,低于18%的长期平均,现金与存款继续高于家庭债务。

  金管局说:“家庭的资产与负债情况良好,本地家庭应该能安然渡过不稳定的经济环境。不过仍需密切留意借贷情况,以控制任何下行风险的冲击。”

  经济持续增长、利率持续偏低,家庭债务在2011年第三季增加了13.4%。

  金管局表示,市场持续不稳定预料将放缓家庭的信贷增长,但是,在利率持续低软的环境下,一些家庭可能会陷入贷款过度。

  因此,金管局提醒借贷者,谨慎评估债务负担能力,考虑收入出现变化或利率上升的影响,至于放贷的银行,则应该维持严谨的放贷标准,严格评估客户的信贷曝险。

家庭的债务增长主要来自房屋贷款,这占家庭贷款的大部分。与房地产市场的交易活动一致,房屋贷款在2010年第四季年比增长23%后,今年第三季放缓至18%;政府在2011年1月推出的额外降温举措,多少让增长缓和下来。
  另一方面,新的房屋贷款也从2011年第一季的134亿元,减少到第三季的124亿元。

  金管局表示,全球经济不稳定,可能削弱房地产市场的气氛,进一步减弱未来几个月的房屋贷款需求。事实上,私人房地产市场的供应与需求指标,已暗示市场的压力有所缓和。

  另一方面,今年第三季的平均贷款与房价比例(Loan-To-Value)是44.1%。比例高过80%的贷款,降至4.9%,而2009年第三季的峰值是17.3%。在这当中,负资产的情况微不足道,而2009年第三季时占2.9%。

  金管局表示,这一方面是房子的估值增加,另一方面也可能是政府在2009年9月推出降温措施后,抑制了新房屋贷款的比例。

  在信用卡方面,第三季的相关贷款增加16%,与2008年第三季的峰值不相上下。不过,坏账注销率和逾期账款依然稳定,前者在4.2%,比中期平均4.7%低,逾期比率则在15%,中期平均为16.4%。


Source/转贴/Extract/Excerpts: 联合早报
Publish date: 19/11/11

Genting Singapore : Downgrade to Sell: Rise in Bad Debt and Loss of VIP Share (Citi)

Genting Singapore
Price (10 Nov 11) S$1.69
Target price S$1.50 from S$2.30
Expected share price return -11.0%
Expected dividend yield 0.0%
Expected total return -11.0%
Downgrade to Sell: Rise in Bad Debt and Loss of VIP Share

 Downgrade to Non-Consensus Sell from Buy; Lowering TP to S$1.50 — At 10.5x 2012 EV/EBITDA, GENS is now trading at a 7% premium to its Macau peers (vs a 10% discount historically), despite weaker market growth prospects. Notwithstanding in-line 3Q11 results normalized for better hold, GENS continues to cede VIP market share to its cross-town rival, Marina Bay Sands (MBS). Further, with a sharp increase in bad debt during the quarter (~60% higher than that of MBS), we downgrade to Sell from Buy and assign a S$1.50 TP (from S$2.30 previously). Our lower TP is derived by assigning equal weight to our DCF and SOTP valuations. In our SOTP valuation, we now value GENS at ~8x EBITDA multiple, a ~20% discount to its Macau peers.

 In-line Normalized EBITDA — GENS reported 3Q net revenue of S$802m (+10% QoQ), relatively in line with our S$826m estimate. Adjusted EBITDA (prior to the provision for bad debt) was S$432m, slightly ahead of our expectation of S$422m, likely reflecting the favorable 3.2% VIP hold rate. GENS reported EBITDA margin was 47% in 3Q (or 55% adjusted for the Bad Debt provision) vs 49% in 2Q. Although we leave our EBITDA estimates largely unchanged, we have raised our 2011-13 earnings estimates by 4 to14% after we made adjustments to our D&A and tax estimates. Despite our upward revision, our estimates are still ~10% below consensus.

 …But Rise in Bad Debt Raises Questions — GENS recorded a S$57m bad debt provision in 3Q, equating to 8.5% of its gaming revenue, an increase from the average of 3% over the past six quarters. On the call, management cited that the group is now more prudent on its bad debt policy, but increases in both the receivable balance and bad debt provision are worrying signs, in our view.

 RWS Cedes Share as VIP Rolling Volumes Remain Flat — 3Q11 results further confirm modest market share loss at RWS to MBS. VIP rolling turnover at MBS rose ~37% sequentially in 3Q, while RWS’ VIP QoQ volumes were flattish in 3Q. On the call, mgmt noted that its VIP volume share had slid to ~44% in 3Q from ~52% in 2Q, but that it still managed to capture 48% of the overall market (again aided by better hold).


Source/转贴/Extract/Excerpts:
Publish date:10/11/11

The next chapter for S-chips

The next chapter for S-chips
Chinese companies were once hotly pursued. Then, they crashed amid scandal and fraud. Is there a second act for these companies and the individuals who brought them to market?

Peter Choo, executive director and major shareholder of CNMC Goldmine Holdings, is no stranger to the media limelight. Over the last 20years, as an investment banker and IPO manager, he often courted attention to promote the companies he brought to market. In 2004, he even donned a Chinese God of Wealth costume to help launch the listing of his own boutique corporate-finance firm in the local market. These days, how-ever, Choo isn’t enjoying the publicity he’s been getting.

While Choo owns a key 15.48%stake in CNMC Goldmine and claims to be working hard to expand the mining company’s business in Malaysia, some market watchers view the company as being just another of his IPO deals rather than part of anew phase of his business career. Inevitably, that has reminded the market of Choo’s role in bringing Chinese companies to the Singapore market— the so-called S-chips — several of which have become embroiled incorporate-governance scandals and even outright fraud.

“The criticism against me is that I am a conman bringing in all these S-chips,” Choo grumbles during an interview with The Edge Singapore recently. “I was responsible for the first two Chinese listings in Singapore, so the impression sticks. But I was not the only guy bringing them in.”

Now, Choo says he wants to set his record as an IPO manager straight, and close that chapter of his career. According to him, it all started in1992, when he arrived in Hong Kong as an employee of DBS Bank to hunt for deals. Chinese companies were taking their first tentative steps into international financial markets by listing in Hong Kong, which was still a British colony at the time. Tsingtao Brewery was the first Chinese company to make the leap, and it was soon followed by the likes of Maanshan Iron and Steel and Sinopec Shanghai Petrochemical.

Choo faced plenty of competition, though. As he tells it, bulge-bracket firms such as Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and Nomura were parachuting their bankers into Hong Kong at the time too, eager to grab a piece of the action. Choo remembers having to wait in line at hotels to do his sales pitch before prospective clients.“It was a ‘beauty parade’. Morgan Stanley was in one room, Nomura in the next. We were all pitching to the Chinese,” he says.

A fluent Cantonese speaker, the Ipoh-born Choo eventually proved he was capable of holding his own against other bankers in Hong Kong by bagging the first two S-chips to list in Singapore. They were Tianjin Zhong Xin Pharmaceutical Group and port operator China Merchants Shekou, which has since become toll-road operator China Merchants Holdings (Pacific) . These two companies listed here in the late 1990s.

By 2000, Choo decided to strike out on his own. With the help of some financial backers, he set up E2 Capital, which would later morph into West-comb Financial Group. Choo would eventually sell out of Westcomb in2008. That firm has since been re-named Asiasons WFG. During the time it functioned as Choo’s vehicle, however, he says it managed a total of 16 S-chip listings. Of those, three would eventually go wrong. They were steel maker FerroChina, which de-faulted on loans of more than RMB5billion in 2008 while still reporting good earnings, and soybean-product and industrial-protein producer Celestial Nutrifoods, which defaulted on convertible bonds amounting to$235 million and transferred money out to a British Virgin Islands company while it appeared to be insolvent. There is also KXD Digital Entertainment, a manufacturer of audio visual entertainment products, which the Singapore Exchange reprimanded for breaching rules on disclosures. Shares in the three companies are suspended from trading.

To put things in perspective, a total of 168 S-chips have listed in Singapore. Of those, at least 19 — or more than 10% — have been suspended from trading or delisted because of a variety of problems, including ac-counting irregularities, loan defaults and fraud.

Hong Leong Bank was associated with the largest number of these problem S-chips — six in total. They were Beauty China, China Milk Products,China Sun Bio-Chem Technology, Fibrechem Technologies, SinoTechfibre and Guangzhao Industrial Forest Biotechnology, which was suspended recently. In fact, Choo’sWestcomb was not even the most prolific issue manager for S-chips. As at end-2009, Stirling Coleman and CIMB had each brought in 19 Chinese companies, according to a tally by Stirling Coleman. Hong Leong Bank was next, with 17 listings.

These issue managers saw their own share of S-chip failures. Stirling Coleman was linked to two of them, while a firm called SAC Capital had fielded another two. The remaining S-chips that failed had been brought in by Collins Stewart, Kim Eng Securities, Genesis Capital, GK Goh (which CIMB acquired in 2005), Daiwa Securities SMC and China Construction Bank

So, why have so many S-chips failed? Will there be more failures in the future? Can anything be done to improve their quality? Or, will the broad mistrust of these companies simply choke off the flow of future S-chip listings?

Boom and bust
Bankers and issue managers with first-hand experience of dealing with Chinese companies say the basic problem is that China doesn’t have a well-established capitalist system. Instead, enterprises had been communally owned for a long time and entwined with all manner of social institutions. Bankers involved with the listing of Tianjin Zhong Xin, for istance, say it was hard work structuring the company for listing. “It’s got hospitals and schools that we could not cut off,” says one banker, who asks not to be identified.

The result is that many Chinese companies that sought listings over-seas had only recently repackaged themselves as businesses. And, they often initially benefited from preferential loans and tax breaks, which didn’t last. Even businesses that were started by individuals often have a Byzantine web of obligations that investors cannot hope to fully understand.

Robson Lee, a lawyer who is an independent director of three S-chip companies, says a common practice among Chinese companies until recently was to lend their surplus cash to business associates, or to act as aguarantor for their bank borrowings. The justification is sometimes little more than that they are people who had helped them in the past. “They see it as a moral obligation to return the favour,” says Lee, who is also assistant honorary secretary at Securities Investors Association Singapore.“They don’t see it as a breach of regulation, but this is unacceptable under corporate governance.”

Some of the companies whose auditors have raised red flags about their reported cash balances are China Hongxing Sports and China Gaoxian Fibre Fabric Holdings. The full details of what exactly went wrong at these companies have yet to be revealed, but some bankers agree with Lee that such problems are par for the course in China.

“Originally, when they moved money around, they didn’t intend to steal,” says one banker of some companies he has encountered. “But when the hole got bigger, they couldn’t fill it.” Issue managers can catch such problems at the pre-IPO stage if they know what to look for, he adds. “I did a deal that was aborted because we found out they intended to use the IPO proceeds to make up for property losses elsewhere.

In developed markets like Singapore, companies prone to such behaviour simply end up being viewed as untrustworthy, of course. Yet, Lee says most Chinese companies don’t deliberately set out to break the rules and commit fraud. “It’s a gap in understanding of what is appropriate, regular and legal vis-à-vis guanxi and face, which are the antitheses of good governance.”

So, why did investors take to these companies? And, how did so many of them end up getting listed in Singapore?

According to investment bankers who have handled IPOs of Chinese companies, the initial wave of state-owned enterprises listing over-seas was soon followed by a rash of middle-tier companies that couldn’t obtain the funds they needed for expansion in China. These companies came to market in the US, HongKong and Singapore and won investors over with the promise of fast growth. Among them were the likes of Full Apex Holdings, a company that produces PET bottles for drinks makers like Coca-Cola. The company was listed in Singapore in 2003,and has since expanded from three factories to eight. It paid generous dividends until 2009. Since an abortive de-listing attempt in 2010, how-ever, the management has disposed of some of its assets, eroding confidence in the company.

The successful listing of such companies spurred demand for more of them. Meanwhile, boutique corporate-finance firms like Choo’s West-comb began sprouting up, eager to do deals. “You have to look at monthly expenses and pay staff and rent,” says one banker of these up-starts. “You might be clouded in your judgement.”

Indeed, some IPO managers began relying on the services of “introducers” to find prospective listings. These introducers were usually Chinese individuals with broad business contacts in their homeland and with some understanding of the listing rules in developed markets. They advised the clients on how to package their companies for an IPO and of-ten took shares at the pre-IPO stage as part of their fees.

Not surprisingly, that resulted in some introducers showing their clients how to highlight their strengths and hide their flaws, one banker says. In fact, some of them would even present the companies to issue managers in Singapore with prospectuses already written and the audit performed. “Issue managers love it because they can submit immediately,” says the banker. “If not, it takes one or two years to get familiar with the people and the system.”

Choo disagrees that any issue man-ager would have accepted the word of an introducer without doing some due diligence. “They know they risk losing their licence,” he says. In fact, SGX told his firm to review its due diligence and internal processes in2005 and Westcomb halted its IPO business for three months to complete the audit.

In 2006, SGX criticised Stirling Cole-man for not doing sufficient due diligence too. This was after several companies that both issuers had brought to market issued profit warnings soon after their trading debuts.


Whatever the case, the kinds of companies that were coming to market by then were making some players nervous. “We are scraping the barrel,” says one banker of the S-chips that were hitting the market.“They get smarter and the introducers helped them to package them-selves. That’s when we said no. We tried some and we didn’t like what we saw. We dumped the introducers and walked away.”

By 2008, as the global financial crisis began to bite, companies across Asia began to struggle. That’s also when a string of problems began emerging at S-chips, ranging from doubts about their cash holdings to embezzlement and forgery of bank statements. Sentiment towards the whole sector quickly soured and S-chips sank across the board, with even some of the more successful ones now trading at low single-digit price-to-earnings ratios.

Who is to blame?
Looking back, the boom in S-chips certainly couldn’t have lasted, given the poor quality of companies that were coming to market, says one in-vestment banker who has worked for17 years at one of the big local banks.“It’s not just one institution but the whole food chain that is affected. Many of the people that started corporate finance in my time have al-ready given up.”

In his view, the local regulators ought to have been more proactive in preventing dodgy S-chips from listing. “When I read the prospectuses, I found [such things as] an apple-juice manufacturer that didn’t own land but was allowed to list,” he says, referring to New Lakeside Holdings. Then, there was Oriental Century, a company that provides education services to a school in Dongguan.“I said the business model won’t work,” the banker says. “When I rejected them, they went somewhere else and they were listed.”

Oriental Century was brought to market by Hong Leong Bank. Its former chairman and CEO WangYuean would tell The Edge Singapore in 2009 that he began siphoning money out of the company al-most as soon as it was listed in order to repay the debts of other privately held entities. Even though a criminal case has been filed in Singapore, the law has yet to catch up with Wang.

The veteran banker also takes is-sue with the way some S-chips were allowed to promote themselves to investors. He notes, for instance, that New Lakeside stated in its prospectus that it might have problems with the title of the land on which some of its factories stood. In his view, an issue like that ought to have been re-solved before the company got listed, instead of simply being stated as a risk.

Elsewhere, he points out that China Milk Products’ main business is not selling dairy products, as its name suggests, but bull semen and embryos for cattle breeding. While investors could have easily discovered the truth by reading the prospectus, that shouldn’t excuse the companies from holding themselves out to be some-thing they aren’t, he says. “Yet, the exchange kept quiet.”

Some market watchers point out that fraud has occurred in other companies besides S-chips, though. In fact, two of Choo’s most high-pro-file failures —Citiraya Industries and Daka Designs— were not Chinese-owned. The former CEO of Citiraya, a recycling company, fled the country in 2005 after he was found to have sold computer chips that he was supposed to have scrapped, pocketing someUS$51 million in the process. On the other hand, Daka Designs was found to have been falsifying its accounts. Its former CEO was jailed for three years and two months for his role in the matter, while its former chairman was jailed for two years. Both individuals were based in Hong Kong

Moreover, other exchanges have suffered their share of failed Chinese companies too. In the first six months of this year alone, auditors of more than 25 Chinese companies listed in the US have resigned or reported financial problems, ac-cording to Stirling Coleman. And, in the first nine months of 2011,more than 20 US-listed Chinese companies have been delisted or suspended.

The Hong Kong market was also caught out in 2002, when orchid grower Euro-Asia gricultural Holdings was found to have fabricated financial numbers to secure a listing. The scandal triggered as ell-off in red chips.

More rules?
The industry players are leery of the idea that tougher regulations governing issue managers and companies are the answer. Lee, the lawyer, says there are already laws to hold professionals involved in an IPO to account. “But post-IPO, if a company runs into systemic management or accounting failure or there is a lapse in internal controls, why should the issue manager or other IPO advisers be held responsible? You have to establish what went wrong, when it started to go wrong and whether the company deliberately misrepresented itself or had withheld material facts and information from professional advisers,” he says.

More rules on companies that come to market could also prove counterproductive, some industry players say. For one thing, enforcing Singapore’s regulations on companies operating in China could be difficult, notes Ang Kay Tiong, CEO of Stirling Coleman. “The motivation and intention [for more regulations] is definitely good, but the challenge comes in the execution,” he says. At any rate, companies have little motivation to comply with regulations associated with a public listing if they aren’t getting a decent market valuation in the first place, he adds.

Already, a number of companies like Sound Global, China XLX Fertiliser and Hongguo International Holdings have sought listings in other regional markets like Hong Kong and Taiwan in the hopes of garnering a better market value, although not always with success. Now, China Animal Healthcare, which al-ready has a secondary listing in HongKong, wants to delist from Singapore.

A senior executive at one S-chip that is seeking to move its listing status to another market says he is tired of his company, which hasn’t run afoul of any regulations, being viewed by investors as just another dodgy S-chip. “Why do I need to spend so much time and effort to prove I’m not guilty? Why be clean in a pig-sty?” he complains.

SGX action
For its part, SGX recently addressed some specific issues related to S-chips. Notably, it has asked directors of S-chips to ensure that the “legal representatives” of their China subsidiaries, who wield significant power as they hold the company seals, can be removed by them. SGX also asked S-chips to beef up their internal controls.“It’s a significant step. It’s a positive step,” says Wong Gang, another lawyer and independent director. “One objective way of looking at it is that companies that are transparent and have good internal governance will have no problem complying with the rules. It will only affect those that are comparatively weaker.”

SGX has also emphasised over the last few years the importance of all market participants, including IPO professionals and boards of directors, making a concerted effort to maintain corporate-governance and listing standards. The various players are responding to the call. For in-stance, issue manager Collins Stew-art asked the introducer who brought Sino Grandness
to the firm to sit on the board as non-executive director, ensuring that their interests would be aligned.

Huang Yupeng, CEO at Sino Grandness, which was listed in 2009, tells The Edge Singapore
that he met the introducer, a Shenzhen businessman named Zhang Gongjun, during a listing seminar. However, Huang says Zhang has indicated that he now wants to resign.

SGX has also made it clear that it is prepared to take action against errant companies. It says accounting irregularities and fraud have been uncovered at 14 S-chips. “Where there are allegations of irregularities, we will direct the boards to appoint special auditors to look into the matter,” says Magnus Böcker, CEO of SGX, during a meeting with its shareholders last month. “In the case of directors and CFOs, SGX will review whether they have discharged their duties and we will continue to take action where there have been lapses.”

He adds that the regulator has also sanctioned issue managers whose due diligence standards have beenin adequate, and will refer other professionals, such as auditors and financial advisers, who have not dis-charged their duties with due care, to the relevant regulatory body for necessary action.

On the other hand, SGX has also been careful to ensure that it doesn’t appear to be targeting a specific segment of the market with especially weighty regulations. In fact, its chair-man, Chew Choon Seng, seemed to acknowledge the peculiar circum-stances faced by S-chips when he quoted Sir Adrian Cadbury in an Oct 24 address at an event related to the 2nd Singapore Corporate Governance Week. “Corporations... work within boundaries which are set bylaw, by regulations, by those who own and fund them and by the expectations of those they serve. The nature of these boundaries varies country by country, and, crucially, changes through time. This is why... there can be nosingle, generally applicable corporate-governance model,” he quoted Cadbury, whose family owns the eponymous chocolate manufacturer. Chew didn’t actually make specific references to S-chips in his speech.

Market cycles
None of this is going to immediately improve investor sentiment towards S-chips. In fact, IPO professionals point out that there has been a dearth of new listings recently. The closest thing to an S-chip that has hit the market recently is Zhongmin BaihuiRetail Group, which was listed in January. While it operates in China, its controlling shareholders, however, are Singaporean. The last Chinese-owned company that operates in China to list in Singapore was actually mush-room grower Yamada Green Re-sources, which launched its IPO in October 2010.

Some bankers say there could be a spate of renewed interest in S-chips once China Hongxing and China Gaoxian answer questions raised by their auditors. “The best time is when the audit re-ports for Hongxing and Gaoxian come out. That is because they have a big following among institutional and retail investors. That will close the chapter,” says one in-vestment banker. “The problem is that investors think all companies are the same. One should not pre-judge. Everyone is innocent until proven guilty.”

Some industry players say sentiment could turn positive as easily as it soured over the last few years. After all, it wasn’t so long ago that manufacturing companies in Hong Kong looked to Singapore for better market valuations. According to Stirling Coleman’s Ang, several Hong Kong-listed companies trading at three or four times earnings would spin off their contract-manufacturing operations and list them in Singapore, where they garnered valuations of eight times earnings.

That was what brought firms like Elec & Eltek and Lung Kee Metal Holdings to the local market. After the Asian financial crisis in 1997,however, the trend reversed. HongKong companies were re-rated and many of them were delisted from Singapore and went back to HongKong. “This shows that the market goes in cycles,” says Ang. “We maybe down now, but not out.”

As for Choo, he claims to have no regrets about being remembered as the one-time King of IPOs. “It’s a compliment and a recognition of my achievement. I would be bluffing if I told you I am not proud of it,” he says. “It’s the association with fraudulent companies that bothers me.” If he succeeds in writing a new chapter to his career, the market might well remember him more charitably.



Source/转贴/Extract/Excerpts: http://www.theedgesingapore.com / No 498
Publish date: 14/11/11

Noble’s Elman starts hunt for new CEO

Noble’s Elman starts hunt for new CEO
From his office overlooking the Victoria Harbour in Hong Kong, Richard El-man has a clear view of the territory’s impressive skyline. As founder of Noble Group, one of the world’s top raw materials supply chain managers behind behemoths such as Glencore, Cargill and Bunge, Elman has for more than 24 years presided over a burgeoning empire that has grown profits and turnover more than tenfold in the past decade or so.

Noble owns coal and iron ore mines, grain-crushing facilities, sugar and ethanol plants,v essels, ports and other infrastructure and seeks to make money from almost every part of the supply chain, from mines and farm-gates to end-commercial users of the processed raw materials.

In 1997, Noble listed on the Singapore Ex-change after delisting from the Hong Kong StockExchange and a short-lived privatisation. Since then, it has almost been a one-way “beat earnings estimates, guide-up earnings forecasts, beat earnings estimates again” story for investors and analysts. Until now, that is.

On Nov 10, Noble reported a 3Q loss of $17.5million, compared with a profit of $157.2 mil-lion a year earlier — way below market expectations. Significant gross-margin compression from extreme volatility in the cotton, carbon credits and aluminium markets were to blame for the company’s woes.

Investors were stunned at the reversal of Noble’s fortunes. Its stock plunged as much as26.48% to close at $1.18 on Nov 10, the lowest in over two years since the market meltdown in the wake of the global financial crisis. Atone point during the day, the stock was down as much as 28% on unusually heavy trading. Indeed, Noble’s first quarterly loss since it posted a small annual loss in 1998 in the aftermath of the 1997/98 Asian financial crisiss pooked investors. The plunge wiped out $2.75billion from Noble’s market capitalisation, or more than $680 million from the net worth of its 25% shareholder Elman

Unexpected exit
But it wasn’t the profit drop that really spooked investors. It was the sudden resignation of well-regarded CEO Ricardo Leiman after the earnings conference call that was the tipping point. Elman, 71, who dropped out of school at the age of 15 to work in a steel scrapyard in England, has for years been trying to convince investors that he finally got the transition right by putting in place an industry insider while he still oversaw things from his perch as chairman. Elman first arrived in Asia in the mid-1960s and worked for several commodities firms before setting up Noble Group. He was regional director of Asia operations for raw-materials trading house Phibro before he struck out on his own.

In September 2010, a sweeping executive reshuffle at Noble pushed Elman upstairs as “chairman emeritus” and transferred all executive powers to CEO Leiman and executive chair-man Tobias Brown, a protégé of late billionaire Jimmy Goldsmith who had previously served as non-executive chairman of Noble.

“I have entered into various personal agreements with Toby [Brown], which ties his interests to my family shareholding in Noble,” Elman gushed at the time.

Yet, just eight weeks later, Brown was gone. In a joint statement, Elman and Brown said they had “mutually agreed that the practical realities of running Noble with both an executive chair-man and a CEO [were] not compatible with the optimal operations of the group”. Elman then returned as chairman of the board.

Now, with Leiman gone, he has again taken over the day-to-day running of the firm that he founded 30 years ago as “acting CEO” and Noble says it has restarted a global hunt for a new CEO. “The sudden departure of Leiman, who was selected following a global head-hunt, especially as the group prepares to spin-off its agribusiness, increases uncertainty on the group’s strategy going for-ward,” notes HSBC’s analyst Thilan Wickramasinghe.

When Brown and Leiman were jointly running the show, they had talked about Noble’s doubling its annual profit to US$1 billion ($1.3billion) by 2013 as growing consumption of grains, sugar, coal and other raw materials in emerging markets such as China, India, Indonesia and Brazil helped boost revenues and margins.

Now, analysts have revised their medium-term outlook for the company, with consensus earnings fore-casts for 2013 closer to US$800 mil-lion, way short of the target touted by Noble’s management just 12months ago.

Analysts have been tripping over each other to drastically slash their price targets for Noble. HSBC down-graded Noble from “overweight” to “underweight”. “We are surprised that management’s guidance leading up to this result has been muggy compared with its track record of effectively communicating its business expectations in the past,” analyst Wickramasinghe notes.

On Nov 10, Credit Suisse down-graded Noble to “neutral” and brought down its price target on the stock from $2.24 to $1.80 (until October, it had a $2.80 price target)

“Noble now trades at 13 times2012 earnings compared to its five-year historical average of 11 times earnings,” Credit Suisse analyst Chua Su Tye notes in a Nov 10 report. “While the longer-term growth strategy stays intact, with valua-tion likely supported by the potential spin-off of its agriculture operations, we expect near-term trading headwinds to persist.”

Annisa Lee, a credit analyst at Nomura Securities in Hong Kong, says a key issue is whether the rating agencies will downgrade Noble’s ratings. She notes that a recent Moody’s re-port on the company warned that it may face downgrade pressure if there is a weakening in liquidity, erosion in margins, aggressive debt-funded expansion or a deterioration in financial profile, and that rival Fitch Ratings had mentioned that there could be negative rating action if the company’s risk and liquidity management deteriorates, if it makes debt-funded acquisitions or if there is a significant drop in tonnage volume.

“While it is not common for rating agencies to downgrade issuer ratings purely based on one set of weak quarterly results, we will not totally rule out the possibility of a rating down-grade, given its deteriorating credit metrics,” she notes. With the uncertain macro back drop related to the European debt crisis and a weakening global economy, she expects no major improvement in next quarter’s earnings.

Looking for new ventures
Do not look for sentiment to turn around quickly for Noble. HSBC’s Wickramasing he says he is likely to remain negative on Noble “until we can get comfort on its ability to structurally re-solve its margin issues in the midst of volatility and there is more clarity on succession”. Stephen Brown, Noble’s director of investor relations, tells The Edge Singapore that there is as much clarity as there needs to be.

Brown says Leiman, a Brazilian and former executive of soft commodities giant LouisDreyfus, who joined Noble as chief operating officer in 2006 following a global search, has been based in London since he took over as CEO in January 2010 and left for entirely personal reasons. He is staying on as adviser and Noble will name a new CEO in due course.

Next up for Noble Group: a listing for its agribusiness on the SGX in 1Q2012. Just hours before it announced the quarterly loss on Nov9, the company received an “in principle” approval from the SGX to list its agribusiness, which Nomura Securities says could be worth more than US$4 billion.

In September 2009, China’s sovereign wealth fund CIC took a 15% stake in Noble and has a deal to co-invest in other agri ventures. Analysts say once its agri entity is listed, Noble is likely to be more proactive in looking for new ventures in soft commodities with its Chinese partner.

Noble is counting on the momentum it has built from its huge capital expenditure in recent years. Over the past 2½ years, Noble has raised nearly US$6 billion through debt and equity as it has added coal mines in Australia, sugar mills in Brazil, soybean crushing plants in China, Argentina and Brazil and other facilities and infrastructure around the world to strengthen its raw-materials pipeline.

As he stares out of his office window, Elman must ponder where his firm really needs to improve its game. While managing investors’ expectations is important, say analysts, his top priority must now be a sharper focus on managing transition and improving Noble’s executive bench




Source/转贴/Extract/Excerpts: http://www.theedgesingapore.com / No 498
Publish date: 14/11/11

Noble’s shock loss

Noble’s shock loss
Investors frown on first quarterly loss in more than a decade, CEO departure

Where several financial crises and economic busts in the last decade failed, a combination of purportedly transient factors in commodity markets succeeded. Noble Group announced on Nov 9 a shock loss in 3Q2011, the first time it has slipped into the red in more than a decade. The HongKong-based commodity trader blames the performance on what it calls extreme volatility resulting from an unstable macroeconomic environment.

“The bursting of the Internet bubble (2000)failed to do it, the public panic that SARS generated (2003) failed to do it, the Lehman Brothers and credit crunch crisis (2008) failed to do it, but 2011 finally saw Noble Group reporting its first quarterly loss since the Asian crisis in1997,” says Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) analyst John Rachmat in a note to clients.

While tonnage and revenue for all its three business segments — agriculture; energy; and metals, minerals and ores — went up substantially in the September quarter from a year earlier, the group still turned in a net loss of US$17.5 million ($22.6 million), compared with earnings of US$157.2 million in 3Q2010and US$139.8 million in 2Q2011.

The factors behind the dismal performance, according to Noble’s founder and chair-man Richard Elman, are “transitory in nature”. On the agriculture front, the cotton business was hurt by farmers walking away from their contracts as a result of extreme price volatility, forcing Noble to buy the commodity in the spot market at elevated prices to honour its obligations to customers. Below-average crop yields in the sugar business in Brazil also took a toll on the agriculture business, which suffered a 70% plunge in operating profit toUS$68.3 million

The fall in operating profit from the metals, minerals and ores division was equally steep, down 74% to US$19.4 million. Margins for this business were eroded by cautious buying by Chinese steel mills as well as volatile aluminium prices.

Of the three business segments, only energy registered an increase in operating profit, up 8% to US$154.7 million. Still, its performance would have been better had it not been for write-downs for Noble’s portfolio of carbon credits. Market prices of carbon credits had slumped as a result of the troubles in Europe. “Due to the fact that this market is not liquid, and that the product is unhedgeable, Noble had to make mark-to-market write-downs on its inventories of this product,” says Rachmat of RBS.

The generally weaker segmental performance, coupled with higher selling, administrative, operating and finance expenses, led to the3Q2011 loss. If that wasn’t bad enough, Ricar-do Leiman has resigned as CEO, citing person-al reasons. Leiman, who took the helm barely two years ago, will remain as an adviser to Noble. Elman will become acting CEO until are placement is found.

Noble’s share price took a huge knock the moment trading started on Nov 10. Even news that the company has received the green light from the Singapore Exchange to list its agriculture business on the Mainboard failed to appease investors. Details of the spin-off have yet to be firmed up but Noble will retain majority control of the unit, Noble Agri, after the listing. Noble shares ended the day 26.5% lower at $1.18, with 436.7 million shares changing hands.

From being one of the Singapore market’ stop picks this year, the stock has overnight been relegated by analysts. “Whatever we feared could go wrong did go wrong,” says CIMB Research’s Lee Wen Ching, who has an “underperform” rating and a 99-cent price target. “The fact that Noble swung into losses despite its 2008/09 success with navigating the downturn suggests that today’s landscape is much more challenging.”

UOB KayHian’s Eugene Ng downgraded Noble to “sell” from “buy” and cut his price target to $1.20 from $2.24. “We previously valued Noble on its post financial-crisis mean PER on expectations of above-average industry growth rates. However, in light of the cur-rent developments, we believe it could take a while for Noble to recover, and its original growth trajectory is called into question.”

Among the contrarians, Daiwa Securities’ Pyari Menon, who retains his “buy” call and$1.80 price target, says Noble’s fundamentals may still be sound given the strong tonnage growth across all business divisions in3Q2011. “We would wait for the markets to sell down Noble over the next few days, and buy the stock for what could be significant upside based on fundamental valuations.”

Rachmat of RBS, who is reviewing his “buy” rating and $2.75 price target, points out that Noble has a strong track record of adding value over the longer term. “Much of the losses in 3Q2011 stem from events which, we believe, are one-off. We therefore do not consider this disappointing one-quarter performance as a black mark against the management’s long-term reputation.”

Whether Noble’s 3Q2011 performance has any implications on other commodity traders remains to be seen, but investors have al-ready taken precautions. Shares of Olam Inter-national fell 6.9% to $2.44 on Nov 10. The company will announce its September-quarter results on Nov 14.

Separately, shares of Wilmar International declined 3.5% to $5.17 on Nov 10, extending their 5.2% loss the day before, when the agribusiness group reported its 3Q2011 results, which some analysts say were below expectations. Earnings rose 23.7% y-o-y to US$321million on improved performances by all business segments except consumer products, which were hurt by higher feedstock costs and government price curbs




Source/转贴/Extract/Excerpts: http://www.theedgesingapore.com / No 498
Publish date: 14/11/11

巴菲特的新选择

巴菲特的新选择
http://www.sina.com.cn 2011年11月19日 01:32 第一财经日报微博
  于百程

  可口可乐、富国银行、美国运通、宝洁(吉列)是巴菲特的四大经典重仓股,十多年来基本未变,这四只股票,几乎占了巴菲特全部普通股投资市值的60%~70%。

  但就在三季度末,巴菲特的四大重仓股被改写了。IBM加入,并占据了第二的位置。

  从今年3月份开始,巴菲特管理的伯克希尔公司在二级市场不断买入IBM的股票,至今已斥资107亿美元,持股约占IBM总股本的5.5%,成为IBM第一大股东。

  这是巴菲特少有的大手笔之一,甚至有人把它和当年买入可口可乐一样相提并论。

  从2010年底开始,IBM股价突破了1999年科网股泡沫的高点,此后至今一路创出新高。在全球经济的低迷点、IBM股价的最高点,用半年时间“秘密建仓”,一买就买成大股东……巴菲特的买入动作和时机选择似乎异常疯狂。

  对股神来说,疯狂的另一面是坚定。

  如何理解这份坚定?

  有投资人士称,巴菲特买入IBM,并非因为IBM的技术。在把PC业务卖给联想后,IBM 已经逐步转型成为一家信息技术服务类公司。

  巴菲特在接受采访时说:“IBM在寻找和保留客户方面的优势一直让我觉得惊奇不已。对一家大公司来说,改变审计公司和律师事务所是大事,让公司IT部门停止使用IBM的产品也同样是大事。这其中有种一贯性在里面,我多年前就应该注意到这一点。”

  客户黏性、良好的管理、持续的分红、清晰的战略规划,这些理由,和巴菲特一贯的理念并无矛盾。

  唯一变化的,是巴菲特这次押注的是IBM——他以前没投过信息技术类公司。

  IBM在1914年已经成立,经历几轮周期,众多曾经的高科技产品,如今已经变成客户基础性需求。

  一些优秀的信息技术类公司,它们的产品已经建立起客户黏性,它们已成为行业标准和规则的制定者,就像可口可乐的浓缩液一样,“护城河”将长期维持。从这点上看,信息技术和大消费公司,没什么不同。

  科网股泡沫破裂已十多年,一些活下来的公司已经默默证明了自己。十多年前巴菲特是旁观者,现在却抓紧了IBM。IBM们已经够伟大了,它们还能变得更伟大。或许,这才是巴菲特给我们的最重要启示。




Source/转贴/Extract/Excerpts: 新浪财经
Publish date: 19/11/11

对冲基金纷纷抛售美银 巴菲特逆势而行

对冲基金纷纷抛售美银 巴菲特逆势而行
http://www.sina.com.cn 2011年11月19日 08:09 华夏时报微博
  Dakin Campbell

  方影译自:bloomberg.com

   近日,全球最具影响力的投资大鳄们对位于北卡罗来纳州夏洛特市的美国银行的投资态度产生了严重分歧。著名对冲基金公司,如Lansdowne Partners Ltd.和Appaloosa Management LP纷纷抛售美国银行股票,Appaloosa基金的知名对冲基金经理David Tepper表示,他已清空了美国银行的所有股票。而投资大师沃伦·巴菲特麾下的Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 则追加了对美国银行的投资。

   在市场恐慌情绪的主导下,美国银行股价大幅下挫,今年以来市值缩水近50%。投资者担心,美国银行能否有足够资金承担大约400亿美元与抵押贷款相关的坏账损失以及经受得住未来有可能迎来的新一轮抵押贷款违约潮。

  对冲基金纷纷离场

   David Tepper曾经在去年大规模押注美国银行股票,就在今年5月份他还预测美国银行的股价将涨至27美元/股。目前,他已抛售其剩余的1000万股美国银行普通股票。同期,纽约资产管理公司Kingdon Capital Management LLC的创始人Kingdon也调整了持仓比例,抛售了1150万股美国银行股票。

   欧洲最大的对冲基金Lansdowne Partners公司,于1998年由Paul Ruddock和Steven Heinz创立,在截止到9月30日的3个月内清空了持有的508万股美国银行股票。由知名对冲基金经理人Jonathon Jacobson管理的位于波士顿的对冲基金公司Highfields Capital Management LP也削减了其对美国银行的持股比例。

   另外,其他的投资者在第三季度也纷纷调整了对美国银行的持股比例,位于伦敦由Crispin Odey创立的对冲基金Odey Asset Management LLP,减持78%;拥有65亿美元资产的对冲基金Dallas-based Carlson Capital LP,减持幅度达98%。

  巴菲特反其道而行

   “尽管他们控制很大的资产规模,但没有任何一家对冲基金有足够强的实力来效仿巴菲特。” 堪萨斯州投资公司Kavar Capital的首席执行官Douglas G. Ciocca在接受电话采访时指出。“巴菲特的注资跟2008年对高盛的注资有很多相似之处。”

   在对冲基金纷纷离场之际,巴菲特掌舵的Berkshire公司于9月份注资50亿美元购买美国银行优先股,股息为6%。所附认股权证将允许巴菲特在2021年9月1日以7.14美元/股的价格认购7亿股美国银行股票,根据8月25日的声明,美国银行有权在任何时候以溢价5%的价格赎回优先股。

   其实,在美国银行的问题上,巴菲特亦非孤单。资本管理公司Fairholme Capital Management LLC的创始人Bruce Berkowitz是当前另一个美国银行股的押注者。第二季度,他加仓700万股美国银行,使其在美国银行的持股数量增至1亿股,他在第三季度继续加仓,截至9月30日,共持有1.05亿股美国银行股票。Berkowitz的策略曾受到投资者的质疑, Berkowitz在8月份召开的电话会议上安抚投资者,称对美国银行的投资将得到预期回报。

   “在金融领域不是每个人都拥有与巴菲特同样的起点,我们不确定美国银行是否可以产生与其他领域相同的投资回报。” 堪萨斯州管理着2.25亿美元资产的投资公司Kavar Capital Partners LLC的首席执行官 Douglas G. Ciocca说,“我不确定投资于美国银行会不会让你的资金得到最好的利用。”

   美国银行股票14日下跌2.6%至6.05美元/股。该股价在第三季度暴跌44%。成为费城KBW银行指数(KBW Bank Index)中表现倒数第二的公司。费城KBW银行指数以美国24家全国性或地区性大型金融机构为成份股,是衡量美国银行业股价表现的重要指标。


Source/转贴/Extract/Excerpts: 新浪财经
Publish date: 19/11/11

Buffett: I Won't Buy Microsoft



Source/转贴/Extract/Excerpts: CNBC
Publish date: 15/11/11

S-REIT: Still safe (CIMB)

Still safe
The first signs of more cash calls to come have surfaced. Whilesome REITs look vulnerable,the sector as a whole is in a much stronger capital positionthan in2008. Portfolio rationalisation is turningout to be a much less painful alternative.


Short-term debt less pressing than before
We assess the capital structures of the sector in 2011 vs. the last crisis in 2008 and conclude that the key difference is significantly lower short-term debt, at 8% of total debt now vs. 38% in 2008. Even though sector asset leverage is not very different (36% in 2011, 34% in 2008), less-pressing short-term liabilities would reduce the likelihood of cash calls, in our view.

Portfolio rationalisation the new alternative
More REITs are recycling and raising funds through asset divestments rather than tapping debt and equity markets. This alternative is made possible by less-pressing impending debt expiries than before.

Top picks: CDLHT, AREIT and PLife
We believe REITs’ attractive yield spreads will remain supported by depressed risk-free rates over the next 12 months. We continue to advocate REITs with strong balance sheets and resilient earnings. Our top picks are CDLHT, AREIT and PLife REIT

Zooming in on debt issues
1. STILL SAFE, FOR NOW
1.1 Stronger than before, although some are weaker than others
With average valuations under book values, we believe SREITs are still worth investing in. We looked more closely at financial indicators such as asset leverage, short-term liabilities, interest coverage and bank covenants and are fairly convinced that balance sheets are much stronger than in 2008. Following KREIT’s recent proposal of a 17-for-20 rights issue, there could be more cash calls in 2012, although these may not be on the same scale and with the same dilution effects as in 2008/2009. We prefer REITs with strong balance sheets and resilient earnings to tide through a possibly rough 2012.

We identify four REITs showing strained balance sheets and possible candidates for cash calls: KREIT, FCOT, ART and Suntec REIT.

1.2 Low risk-free levels to support yieldspreads
Our house believes that developed economies will maintain their loose monetary policies in view of rising risks to global growth. The Fed has a conditional commitment to keep interest rates low until mid-2013, and has also activated Operation Twist to reduce long-term interest rates in order to provide cheaper funding to consumers and businesses. Most Asian central banks are likely to hold their rates for an extended period or ease liquidity conditions by unwinding some of their credit and liquidity-restraining measures. We believe REITs’ attractive yield spreads may remain supported by depressed risk-free rates over the next 12 months..

2. REVIEWING FINANCIAL INDICATORS
2.1 Short-term debt less pressing than in 2008
We assess the capital structures of the sector, specifically comparing asset leverage, near-term liabilities, debt expiries, interest coverage ratios, the level of encumbrances and the level of fixed debts in 2011 vs. 2008.

We conclude that the key difference is much lower short-term debt, at 8% of total debt now vs. 38% in 2008. Even though sector asset leverage is not very different (36% in 2011, 34% in 2008), less-pressing short-term liabilities would reduce the likelihood of cash calls, in our view.


2.2 Financial strength of sponsorsa key component of bank covenants
As we review bank covenants with REITs, we did not find any particularly demanding conditions. Generic conditions include adhering to the 60% asset leverage limit, and maintaining interest cover ratios at 1.5-2x, and LTV ratios of 60-80% for secured bank loans. None of the REITs is anywhere near breaching these covenants with their key metrics well covered beyond what is required by debt covenants. Other qualitative considerations by the banks typically include the strength of sponsors, corporate guarantees, and asset quality and class. Of less consequence are debt maturity profiles, the level of encumbrances and credit ratings.

Among qualitative considerations, the financial strength of sponsors is one of the most important, and pivotal in deciding banks covenants with the respective REITs. Recent announcements from a number of REITS after their 3Q results show that almost all the REITs under our coverage would need to repay more than 50% of their loans if their sponsors cease to own the REIT managers, and/or cease to be significant shareholders of the REIT units. Interestingly, AREIT has the lowest portion of loans at risk at only 10%.


2.3 Portfolio rationalisation the new alternative
Over the last year, a new trend has emerged of more REITs recycling and raising funds through asset divestments rather than tapping debt and equity markets. These include Suntec REIT’s recent divestment of Chijmes to fund its massive AEI, MLT’s divestment of two small assets, and CCT’s sale of Robinson Point and StarHub Centre. ART and FCOT have obtained Outline Planning Permission to redevelop Somerset Grand Cairnhill and Key Point respectively.

We believe these two REITs could divest these assets to beef up their balance sheets or fund acquisitions when opportunities arise.

We are positive that REIT managers are re-evaluating their portfolios and believe this is possible only with less-pressing impending debt expiries than before. Portfolio rationalisation is also an improved alternative to recapitalisation, in our view.

3. WHO ARE AT RISK?


3.1 REITs with asset leverage nearing 45%
As at Sep 11, asset leverage in the sector averaged 36%. Although 60% is the regulatory limit for REITs with credit ratings, we understand that most credit agencies would give more favourable credit ratings for asset leverage under 45%. We believe recapitalisation would be a very near-term possibility when asset leverage nears 45%, going by the last crisis.

3.2 Office sector carries greatest devaluation risks
We believe the office sector is the most vulnerable to asset devaluation, given the typically larger fluctuations in rents, occupancy and cap rates here than for the other asset types. During the last crisis, office assets were devalued by 45% from their peak in 2008 on a 200-300bp spike in cap rates although devaluation captured on the books of office REITs were more measured at 15-20%.

In contrast, industrial assets have typically longer lease structures with stable occupancy, resulting in more stable asset values. During the last crisis, the increase in cap rates was only 20-30bp for local industrial REITs with a greater variance for business and science parks.

Suburban retail assets likewise enjoy more stable asset values, backed by steady occupancy and rentals due to their dependence on non-discretionary spending and good residential catchment areas.

We stress-test the asset leverage of the 15 REITs under coverage, and identify ART, MLT, KREIT and Suntec REIT as the most vulnerable to potential falls in asset values. A 10% dip in asset values would throw them beyond the 45% gearing level. Conversely, CDLHT boasts the most resilient balance sheet where asset leverage would still stay under 45% with even a 40% fall in asset values.


Overall, we are less concerned about sharp asset devaluation in 2011 as asset values have yet to touch previous peaks, with greater caution in booking revaluation gains since the last crisis.

3.3 Pressing near-term debt
FCOT stands out in this test as the only REIT with 100% of its debt expiring in 2012. Debt maturities for ART and CCT are also fairly high at 35% and 34% respectively. We understand that FCOT and ART are already evaluating their refinancing options. We are least concerned about CCT as it remains well buffered by S$486m of cash, mainly divestment proceeds from StarHub Centre and Robinson Point.


3.4 Evaluation in totality
We evaluated four REITs whose overall credit metrics appear strained at the
moment. They also look like possible candidates for near-term cash calls:
K-REIT, FCOT, ART and Suntec REIT.


3.5 K-REIT: not entirely unscathed
We believe risks of a cash call for K-REIT are the highest among the four we highlighted. Aggregate leverage remains high at 42% even after its 17-for-20 rights issue to finance the acquisition of Ocean Financial Centre, and 20% of its debt is due for refinancing in 2012.

While KREIT is not anywhere near breaching its loan covenants or struggling to refinance its near-term debt, we do see risks of asset devaluation at year-end, leading to higher asset leverage. Unlike ART and FCOT, KREIT does not appear to have divestment opportunities. Further, the market anticipates that Marina Bay Financial Centre Phase 2 (MBFC Phase 2) would eventually be injected into KREIT upon completion, likely in late 2012. We expect yet another cash call then since it does not insufficient debt headroom to acquire this asset.

During the last crisis, K-REIT issued rights twice, in Mar 08 and Oct 09, for debt repayment, lowering its gearing from 54% to 28% and from 33% to 9% respectively. History may just repeat itself.

3.6 FCOT: high risks, high returns?
FCOT has one of the weakest capital metrics in our SREIT universe, stemming from: 1) its fairly high asset leverage of 37%, which could spike when assets are devalued (asset portfolio is weaker than for the other office REITs); 2) 100% debt maturing next year; 3) lower interest cover than peers; and 4) 100% secured debt.
That said, it is in a stronger position this time round, backed by: 1) a strong asset divestment opportunity in Key Point which has received provisional permission for redevelopment into a higher-value mixed residential/commercial project; 2) opportunities for upward rental reversions in FY12 when the master lease for China Square expires; 3) opportunities to refinance 100% of its expensive debt due to expire in FY12 (a 50bp reduction in interest cost could lift its DPU by 10%); 4) stronger parentage in FCL/F&N; 5) a more resilient asset portfolio after the paring down of non-core holdings in Japan and increased buffer from a master lease in Alexandra Technopark; and 6) much improved asset-liability currency matching.

We believe FCOT could also explore the possibility of an asset swap of Key Point with its sponsor’s asset Valley Point, or Alexandra Technopark with Valley Point to improve its portfolio quality.

3.7 ART: highgearing and European debt concerns
ART’s credit metrics are fairly weak with asset leverage high at 41%, 35% of its borrowings due next year and more than 50% of these denominated in euro and £, which risk higher interest costs upon refinancing. Additionally, we anticipate a devaluation of its European assets as cap rates widen and earnings weaken.
Nonetheless, the likelihood of near-term cash calls could be reduced if it is able to divest Somerset Grand Cairnhill, which has received provisional approval for a mixed residential and hotel development. Alternatively, ART could consider an asset swap of Somerset Grand Cairnhill with its sponsor’s Ascott Raffles Place. Ascott Raffles Place was reportedly worth S$250m in Nov 10, on par with Somerset Grand Cairnhill’s S$272m. In our view, an asset swap is more ideal, as rental incomes would be sustained and revenue contributions from Singapore could be kept intact.

3.8 Suntec: weak link to Cheung Kong limits risks for now
With asset leverage at 41% and the office sector facing considerable headwinds, Suntec is yet another potential candidate for a near-term cash call.
However, we believe the impetus to do so is not strong, given that capex needs could be partially met by divestment proceeds from CHIJMES. Near-term debt is not high, interest coverage remains high while asset values are still below peak levels. Most importantly, unlike their office peers with strong sponsors (i.e. KREIT, CCT and FCOT) which hold substantial stakes in the REITs, Suntec does not have direct links with Cheung Kong. With a much larger free float, equity fund-raising would be more difficult, in our view. During the last crisis, it was one of the few large-cap REITs to successfully refinance without a cash call.
In short, we deem a near-term cash call less likely until it is ready to acquire MBFC Phase 2.

4. VALUATION AND RECOMMENDATION
4.1 Our top picks:CDLHT, AREIT and PLife
We remain comfortable with our Overweight position on the SREIT sector and advocate REITs with strong balance sheets and resilient earnings. Our top picks are CDLHT, AREIT and PLife.

CDLHT has shed 24% YTD (average 11% fall for the sector) and is now marginally trading above book value (vs. its 5-year average of 1.3x P/BV). We believe its valuations are compelling in view of sustained visitor arrivals into Singapore and rising RevPAR. Our comfort level remains high because of its strong balance sheet, a highly-disciplined management when it comes to acquisitions, and high market transaction values for its hotels such as Park Regis (S$916,000/room key vs.
average of S$585,000 for its Singapore portfolio). Additionally, the possible listing of another hospitality trust, M&L REIT, early next year could attract attention to the sector.

We remain partial to the retail and industrial sectors for their more resilient earnings and organic growth prospects. Among large-cap REITs, we like AREIT and CMT. We still advocate CCT as a good Trading Buy despite negative macro indicators for offices on account of its low asset leverage and undemanding valuations. Among the smaller caps, we like FCT, Cache and PLife.




Source/转贴/Extract/Excerpts: CIMB-Research,
Publish date: 17/11/11

HPHTrust: Earnings meet forecast, throughput misses guidance but margins improve (UOBKH)

Hutchison Port Holdings Trust – Singapore
BUY (Maintained)
Share Price US$0.675
Target Price US$0.81
Upside +20.0%
3Q11: Earnings meet forecast, throughput misses guidance but margins improve

• Revenue was 7.5% below forecast. Hutchison Port Holdings Trust’s (HPHT) revenue including other income was HK$3,246.6m, or 7.5% below forecast, due primarily to weaker-than-expected throughput growth. Throughput in HIT and Cosco-HIT increased 1.4% yoy in 3Q11, but was 8.6% below forecast. In line with the weakness in Pearl River Delta (PRD) exports, Yantian’s 3Q11 throughput declined 5% yoy and came in 10% less than forecast. Average tariff slightly improved 1-2% on a higher percentage of original & destination (O&D) and laden containers which have higher tariffs.

• Margin expansion ensured bottom line met forecast. Total operating expenses were 10% lower than forecast, thanks to well cost control initiatives- staff cost and trust expenses were 17.5% and 11.6% below forecasts respectively. Depreciation and amortisation was HK$677.4m, or 6.8% less than guidance. Despite a weaker-than-expected peak season throughput in 3Q11, profit attributable to unitholders of HK$708.4m met forecast.

Stock Impact
• PRD throughput recovery in 4Q11 enables full-year earnings to meet guidance. According to Ministry of Communication (MOC)’s preliminary figures, container throughput recovered in October, particularly in PRD. Throughput grew 7% in Yantian and 14% in Hong Kong in October respectively. Management expects 2011 peak season to last longer despite the peak volume being clearly lower than in 2010, and believe a relatively stronger 4Q11 will enable HPHT’s full-year earnings to meet forecast.

• 2012 could be challenging but still in a growth pattern. The 2012 forecast provided in the prospectus needs be reviewed and we believe a new guidance is very likely to be lower on uncertainties in the US and Europe economic recovery. Management guides low single digit growth for O&D container volume in PRD but remains optimistic on transshipment cargo volume as well as on intra-Asia trade. Given a combination of positive drivers such as firm transhipment volume and overhangs including manufacturing moving out of PRD, we would like to keep our forecast of a 3% growth in PRD.

Earnings Revision/Risk
• None.

Valuation/Recommendation
• Maintain BUY and target price of US$0.81. Underlying 2012 dividend yield of 9% looks more attractive than that of almost all large-cap REITs and trusts listed in Singapore.

Share Price Catalyst
• Container throughput recovery in 4Q11 in PRD and Hong Kong.


Source/转贴/Extract/Excerpts: UOB Kay Hian Research
Publish date:15/11/11

Genting Singapore New report: 9M11 results a touch light but 4Q is a peak season (CS)

Genting Singapore
Price (10 Nov 11 , S$) 1.69
TP (prev. TP S$) 2.50 (2.50)
Est. pot. % chg. to TP 48
Maintain OUTPERFORM
New report: 9M11 results a touch light but 4Q is a peak season

● GENS’s 3Q11 results were a touch light; revenues and EBITDA were 72% and 70% of our FY11E forecasts, respectively. 4Q is traditionally a peak period for the business.

● While the bears on GENS will focus on the continued sequential decline in VIP market share, we believe luxury room capacity constraint is one of the problems and new rooms due next few months should help. GENS is also hopeful that there will be junkets licensed soon in Singapore.

● We continue to rate GENS an OUTPERFORM, and remain bullish on its long-term growth prospects. Additionally, GENS is eyeing Japan and Korea for potential gaming investment opportunities.

● We expect GENS to benefit from: (1) rising tourist arrivals to Singapore, (2) positive economic growth in the region, (3) a high proportion of local millionaires bodes well for long-term VIP casino revenues, (4) mainland Chinese have become the top foreign purchasers of residential properties in Singapore, and (5) robust commodity prices in Malaysia.

9M11 results a touch light
GENS’s 3Q11 results were a touch light; revenues and EBITDA were 72% and 70% of our FY11E forecasts, respectively. 4Q is traditionally a peak period for the business. 9M11 revenue grew 25% YoY while adjusted EBITDA grew 21% YoY against 9M10 (casino operations only began mid-Feb). 3Q11 adj. EBITDA was 8% stronger QoQ and 7% YoY; the benefit of a higher win rate was countered by a surge in impairment charge for 3Q11 to S$57 mn vs S$19 mn in 2Q11 (largely a precautionary approach by management). EBITDA margin guidance remains at 45-50%.

Highlights from the conference call
Management estimates RWS had a 44% share of VIP rolling-chip volumes (versus 52% in 2Q11) and a 48% share of mass market drop. While the bears on GENS will focus on the continued sequential decline in VIP market share, we believe luxury room capacity constraint is one of the problems (as 80-90% of their VIP customers are from abroad). New luxury rooms due on stream in 4Q11 and 1Q12 will help address the issue. Positively, GENS is also hopeful that there will be junkets licensed in the next few months in Singapore. In the longer term, GENS is eyeing Japan and Korea for potential gaming
investment opportunities.

Multi-year growth story
We continue to rate GENS an OUTPERFORM, and remain bullish on the longer-term prospects of the business. The Maritime museum was opened in October while luxury-class hotel room capacity at RWS should double by 1Q12. Potential drivers for GENS are: 1) strong tourist arrivals to Singapore; 9M11 arrivals +14.8% YoY, 2) positive economic growth in the region, 3) a high proportion of local millionaires, 4) mainland Chinese have become the top foreign purchasers of residential properties in Singapore, positive for long-term VIP revenues, and 5) robust commodity prices in Malaysia.

We see the following potential catalysts for GENS:
● The realisation that GENS is still in the early part of a multi-year growth trajectory.
● As and when junkets are licensed in Singapore, we believe there’s potential upside to VIP gaming revenues and lower credit risk to operators.
● If market risk appetite were to improve, GENS is a high beta stock and could benefit.


Source/转贴/Extract/Excerpts: Credit Suisse
Publish date:10/11/11
Warren E. Buffett(沃伦•巴菲特)
Be fearful when others are greedy, and be greedy when others are fearful
别人贪婪时我恐惧, 别人恐惧时我贪婪
投资只需学好两门课: 一,是如何给企业估值,二,是如何看待股市波动
吉姆·罗杰斯(Jim Rogers)
“错过时机”胜于“搞错对象”:不会全军覆没!”
做自己熟悉的事,等到发现大好机会才投钱下去

乔治·索罗斯(George Soros)

“犯错误并没有什么好羞耻的,只有知错不改才是耻辱。”

如果操作过量,即使对市场判断正确,仍会一败涂地。

李驰(中国巴菲特)
高估期间, 卖对, 不卖也对, 买是错的。
低估期间, 买对, 不买也是对, 卖是错的。

Tan Teng Boo


There’s no such thing as defensive stocks.Every stock can be defensive depending on what price you pay for it and what value you get,
冷眼(冯时能)投资概念
“买股票就是买公司的股份,买股份就是与陌生人合股做生意”。
合股做生意,则公司股份的业绩高于一切,而股票的价值决定于盈利。
价值是本,价格是末,故公司比股市重要百倍。
曹仁超-香港股神/港股明灯
1.有智慧,不如趁势
2.止损不止盈
成功者所以成功,是因为不怕失败!失败者所以失败,是失败后不再尝试!
曾淵滄-散户明灯
每逢灾难就是机会,而是在灾难发生时贱价买股票,然后放在一边,耐性地等灾难结束
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